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Abstract This study investigates the drivers of pressures from various institutions 
in the nonmarket environment and the responses of MNEs to these pressures in a 
host country. By taking a broad institutional perspective, this study pairs and inte-
grates the economic perspective of new institutionalism and the sociological per-
spective of neo institutionalism with the corporate political strategy perspective. 
This research provides a systematic review of the drivers underlying pressures from 
various types of nonmarket institutions that explain the preference of firms to use 
a transactional or relational strategy to deal with these pressures. The evidence is 
based on research involving MNEs in the Netherlands. The nonmarket institutions 
that exert the greatest pressures at the national level pushing MNEs to use trans-
actional more than relational strategies and tactics are regulatory and standards 
agencies. The pressures of political institutions, interest groups, and the media, in 
contrast, trigger MNEs to employ relational rather than transactional strategies and 
tactics.
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1 Introduction
In the current competitive business landscape, it has become essential for most 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) not only to focus on the relationships with mar-
ket actors, but also with nonmarket institutions: Political institutions, regulatory 
and standards authorities, and social institutions, such as the media and interest 
groups (Hillman et al. 2004; Mellahi et al. 2016). For many MNEs, these institu-
tions and their power, obligations and influences have a major impact on their 
sustainable competitive position (Kassinis and Vafeas 2006; Dieleman and Bod-
dewyn 2012; Doh et  al. 2012; Lawton et  al. 2013). In particular, MNEs with a 
high dependence on nonmarket institutions may have to pursue political or social 
objectives in order to align their interests with those of the institutions (Marquis 
and Qian 2014), establishing the flow of critical resources (Kostka and Zhou 
2013) or obtaining the support of critical stakeholders (Wang and Qian 2011). 
Much MNE research has explored the challenges the organizations face, the 
strategies and tactics they can undertake in dealing with institutions in various 
nonmarket contexts and their performance (Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Rajwani 
and Liedong 2015). For instance, Boddewyn (2016) provides an interesting over-
view of the studies dealing with the relationships between MNEs and political 
and regulatory institutions. Marano and Tashman (2011) investigate the relation-
ship between MNEs and nongovernmental organizations. Vachani et  al. (2009) 
show NGO influence on MNE social development strategies in varying nonmar-
ket contexts. However, many studies have investigated a restricted selection of 
nonmarket institutions in relation to MNE nonmarket behaviour. MNEs must deal 
with various types of institutions and their pressures in the nonmarket context 
simultaneously. How they manage the pressures from these institutions depends 
on the perceived formal and informal power and obligations of the institutions. 
Nonmarket institutional pressures consist of various drivers. Our knowledge of 
the composition of drivers and perceived power of nonmarket institutions in a 
particular setting and the responses of MNEs is still limited (Hiatt et al. 2015). 
Specifically missing is an examination of how underlying drivers of pressures of 
various types of institutions affect the nonmarket behaviour of MNEs in a host 
environment (Lux et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2016). Doh et al. (2012, p. 23) stress 
that “both scholars and managers need to understand the institutional factors in 
more detail in nonmarket research”. Hence, it is imperative to gain a better under-
standing of the perceived impact of nonmarket institutional pressures on MNEs, 
the underlying drivers of these pressures and how MNEs behave in a host non-
market environment.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore the various types of nonmarket 
institutional pressures that influence MNEs nonmarket strategies. We will do so 
by assessing both the underlying perceived formal and informal drivers of cer-
tain classes of nonmarket institutional pressures and the resulting relationships 
between the classes of pressures and the MNEs’ responses. The extant litera-
ture on factors driving institutional pressures has been largely developed from 
two main perspectives: The institutional perspective and the corporate political 
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strategy perspective. Doh et  al. (2012) emphasize that the integration of differ-
ent perspectives is a logical next step in advancing nonmarket strategy research. 
Therefore, this study combines institutional and corporate political strategy 
perspectives to examine the primary drivers of certain classes of institutional 
pressures facing MNEs in a nonmarket environment and how the organizations 
respond to these pressures. This study further contributes to the nonmarket strat-
egy literature because we investigate the relationships between various types of 
nonmarket institutional pressures and the nonmarket behavior of MNEs in a non-
US setting.
Aguinis and Glavas (2012) emphasize that institutional theory can help elucidate 
why MNEs may feel compelled to develop nonmarket activities and strategies. Ioan-
nou and Serafeim (2012) stress that institutional theory provides insight into the 
challenges facing MNEs in establishing legitimacy in various host nonmarket con-
texts. According to Doh et al. (2012), nonmarket strategy research is embedded in 
multiple institutional perspectives and levels of analysis. Two important perspectives 
in institutional theory relevant to the field of nonmarket strategy and MNEs are new 
institutional economics (Clougherty and Grajek 2008) and neo-institutional perspec-
tive (Orr and Scott 2008). Therefore, this research applies the economic perspec-
tive of new institutionalism and the sociological perspective of neo institutionalism, 
because their overall orientation emanates from similar traditions, level of analysis, 
and perspectives (Doh et al. 2012). Both perspectives emphasize the importance of 
political, social and economic institutions in constraining and facilitating the non-
market behavior of firms.
Taking this broad institutional perspective, this study also incorporates a corpo-
rate political strategy perspective to investigate strategic responses to various non-
market institutional pressures. The corporate political literature defines and meas-
ures different types of reactive and proactive nonmarket strategies (e.g., Baron and 
Diermeier 2007; Blumentritt and Nigh 2002; Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Mez-
nar and Nigh 1995). One commonly used typology was developed by Hillman and 
Hitt (1999) (Hillman et al. 2004; van Kranenburg et al. 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016). 
They classified the types of nonmarket strategies into two broad categories. Firms 
can develop relational nonmarket strategies that are long-term oriented and create a 
certain in-depth base within the nonmarket environment meant to avoid or decrease 
nonmarket influences on their activities. They can also develop and implement a 
transactional nonmarket strategy to deal with nonmarket actors and issues in their 
environment. This type of strategy is based on mainly event-specificity and tempo-
rary actions. Firms can use both types of strategies simultaneously to respond to 
nonmarket institutional pressures (Nell et al. 2015).
Notwithstanding the growth of nonmarket strategy studies, Lawton et  al. (2013) 
emphasize that studies in the nonmarket strategy field have traditionally focused on the 
United States, where particular nonmarket strategies are used and are considered more 
ethically appropriate than in other developed countries. The reason for the US focus is 
that hard data and ample material are available to develop and test hypotheses. Many 
emerging and developed economies do not have the same degree of transparency as the 
United States. In addition, many developed economies have more collegial firm nonmar-
ket institutions relations and are less conflicting than those in the US. The United States 
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can be characterized as a pluralist economy. Nonetheless, a growing interest exists in 
expanding nonmarket strategy research beyond the US domain. In addition, much of this 
work analyzes the firm-political institution relations, but does not include various non-
market institutions (Peng et al. 2009; Boddewyn 2016). The empirical evidence of this 
study comes from MNEs operating in a corporatist economy the Netherlands. Therefore, 
a second contribution of this study to the nonmarket strategy field is the analysis of how 
firms perceive the drivers of pressures of nonmarket institutions in a non-US setting. 
The Netherlands is a small, industrialized economy with an open integrated economy 
and one of the founding members of the European Union (EU). There is strong and 
close cooperation amongst employers’ organisations, labour unions and the government, 
leading to abundant negotiations, as well as substantial rules and regulations that over-
see an extensive welfare state. This close cooperation has led to both a stable economic 
and political environment and to joint initiatives for economic integration in Europe that 
have made the Netherlands an interesting host location for MNEs. The Netherlands rep-
resents one of the largest recipients of foreign investments in the world and, due to its 
favorable location and active role within the European Union, many MNEs have cho-
sen the country as strategic orientation (UNCTAD 2011). Data on foreign firms were 
obtained through a questionnaire survey and existing data sets.
Results show that the factors that determine the significant pressure of regulatory 
agencies mainly involve a temporary issue perspective on rules and regulations, insuf-
ficient autonomy of regulatory institutions and insufficient transparency in terms of 
rules and regulations. With regard to standards agencies, the pressure stems from costs, 
both in terms of complying with imposed standards and in terms of obtaining permits, 
licenses and authorisations. The institutional drivers that are specific to the pressure of 
political institutions include the saliency of policy issues and the costs of politics. Inter-
est groups exert pressure through their ability to influence public opinion and through 
their collective concerns. In addition, institutional drivers related to media pressures 
include media credibility and its societal influence. Furthermore, evidence shows that 
the pressures from political institutions, interest groups, and the media are more likely 
to elicit relational rather than transactional strategies and tactics, whilst pressures from 
regulatory agencies, and standards agencies engender transactional nonmarket more 
than relational strategies and related tactics.
The structure of this study is as follows: Sect. 2 explores the drivers of pressures 
from various types of nonmarket institutions that trigger different nonmarket strate-
gies of firms, and presents the hypotheses. In Sect.  3, we present the study sam-
ple, method and data, along with a structural equations model. Section 4 contains 
the analysis and empirical results; we conclude with a discussion of the results and 
implications in Sect. 5.
2  Hypotheses
2.1  Institutional Environment
Institutional theory has gained momentum in exploring nonmarket strategy research 
(Henisz and Delios 2004). This theory has a rich and diverse set of traditions with 
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different perspectives on the relationship between actors and institutions. Two domi-
nant institutional perspectives that have gained traction in the nonmarket strategy 
literature are the new institutional economics (North 1990) and neo institutional-
ism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Although these perspectives have offered varied 
conceptualization of institutions and their impact, the perspectives are not discrete 
or discriminant (Doh et al. 2012). Hence, pairing and integrating these perspectives 
will advance the nonmarket strategy field. New institutional economics is an eco-
nomic perspective that focuses on the social and legal norms and rules that under-
lie economic activities. It studies the role that culture, legal systems, and political 
institutions have on economic development. North (1990) defines institutions as 
the rules of the game in a society and the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction and structure political, economic and social interactions. Such 
constraints are devised as formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and as 
informal restraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct), which 
usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and safety within a market or society. 
Informal constraints are more a result of tradition while formal institutions serve to 
solve the problem of trust and protection (Mantzavinos 2001). Here institutions have 
a largely constraining character, setting clear boundaries on actor behavior (Ingram 
and Clary 2000). Institutions provide structure and order by aligning actor actions 
and expectations. Although institutions are seen as exogenous to actors, they can 
change over time. According to North (1990), it is the interaction between insti-
tutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of the economy. 
Therefore, to understand an institution, it is important to look at both the rules and 
the actors, seeing each as interdependent of the other.
The second dominant institutional perspective in the nonmarket strategy field is 
neo institutionalism. This sociological perspective on institutionalism emphasizes 
the social structures and relationships that occur within society and how these struc-
tures define and shape broader systems and the role of organizations within them 
(Doh et al. 2012). While the new institutional economics perspective stresses that 
people consciously design institutions to help them efficiently meet their goals, 
neo institutionalism stresses that institutions are not human designs but rather 
evolve from the particularities of a given historical and cultural context (Dimag-
gio and Powell 1983). Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 98) therefore define institutions 
as “historical accretions of past practices and understandings that set conditions on 
actions”. The construction of an institution, commonly referred to as the process of 
institutionalization, occurs through collective political, social and cultural accept-
ance of practices driven by the attainment of legitimacy for these actions. Scott 
(2008) gives a less deterministic interpretation of institutions. He focuses more on 
inter-subjectivity and individual interpretations rather than large social processes. 
Scott (2013, p. 56) defines institutions as “comprised of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life”. Accordingly, institutions are catego-
rized into three pillars: The regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. In particu-
lar, institutions based on the regulatory pillar have the ability to establish rules, 
monitor compliance with these rules, and deliver sanctions, rewards or punishment 
when necessary to influence future behavior (Scott 2013). These regulative activities 
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can either be enforced formally by government authority or can be enforced more 
informally through societal pressure. Normative systems constrain social behavior 
through rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, mandates and licenses (Geels 
2004; Scott 2013). The social prescriptions that define legitimate behavior, trans-
mitted for instance by the state or professional associations, may become taken-
for-granted over time and, as a consequence, are very difficult to change (Suchman 
1995).
Hence, neo institutionalism is concerned with the social context within which 
organizations operate and as such seeks to understand social structures which have 
attained a high degree of resilience (Scott 2013). These social structures have often 
existed for decades and have only been subjected to small changes over time (Van 
den Hoed and Vergragt 2006). As a consequence, institutions often create stability, 
as well as inertia, in a social system. Thus, the main premise of the sociological per-
spective on institutionalism holds that organizations are influenced by institutional 
logics (Greenwood et al. 2011). It suggests that firm behavior is a direct reflection 
of the degree of conformity of organizations to the institutional pressures imposed 
on them by their environment. However, it is evident that in reality, firms can and 
will not uniformly respond to institutional pressures, as their behavior as a response 
to these pressures will vary depending on the context and nature of the institutional 
pressures they are confronted with (Oliver 1991; Greenwood et al. 2008). In other 
words, “organizational behavior may vary from passive conformity to active resist-
ance in response to institutional pressures, depending on the nature and context of 
the pressures themselves” (Oliver 1991, p. 146). Thus, taking a broader institutional 
perspective is valuable in understanding organizational behavior as a response to the 
environment. A main premise of institutional theory is that the institutional environ-
ment and the resulting institutional pressures have a profound influence on organi-
zational behavior, often more substantial than market pressures (Meyer and Rowan 
1977).
2.2  Nonmarket Strategies
Firms should go beyond formulating market strategies and thoroughly consider 
complementary strategies to encounter complex influences outside the market, and 
to increase their legitimacy, performance and ultimately their competitive position. 
These nonmarket strategies involve actions carried out in social, political and legal 
arenas (Baron 1995; Shaffer and Hillman 2000) to counter pressures from various 
nonmarket institutions. Firms can proactively participate in the nonmarket envi-
ronment to achieve their objectives and potential benefits from nonmarket behav-
ior (Baysinger 1984). These proactive nonmarket strategies and tactics complement 
market strategies and related tactics, monitor public interests in the nonmarket envi-
ronment and further assist firms in coping with interdependence issues between 
market and the nonmarket environment, influencing their market activities (Baron 
and Diermeier 2007; Boddewyn 2003; Doh and Lucea 2013; Shaffer and Hillman 
2000).
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Different strands of strategy research have examined the strategies that firms 
employ to manage the nonmarket environment (Mellahi et al. 2016). Organization 
response perspective (Oliver 1991) and the corporate political strategy (Hillman and 
Hitt 1999) perspectives are often used in the nonmarket strategy research. Research 
in the field of corporate political strategy focuses on the rationale for firms to have a 
corporate political strategy, the characteristics of firms engaging in corporate politi-
cal activities, and to what extent firm’s strategies and related tactics are effective. 
Based on nonmarket and corporate political strategy literature, proactive nonmar-
ket strategies can be regarded as transactional and relational strategies (Hillman and 
Hitt 1999). Relational strategies and tactics are defined as proactive practices which 
minimise surprises from political institutions, regulatory and standards agencies 
and social institutions such as interest groups and the media, and exercise control 
over institutional processes, aiming to maximise the alignment of the firm with its 
environment and with collective interests (Mahon et al. 2004). The relational rep-
ertoire includes long-term oriented actions and cooperative tactics meant to strate-
gically interact and to pursue strategic goals through social and political leverage 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999). Furthermore, relational strategies and tactics serve to build 
relationship networks with various actors active in the nonmarket environment in 
order to leverage social capital. Relational strategies and tactics help firms to build 
critical mass vis-a-vis nonmarket issues that affect the organisation or to build a cer-
tain reputation (Baron and Diermeier 2007; Itoh 1993; Keim and Zeithaml 1986) to 
increase mutual trust and information transfer and to improve joint problem-solving 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999; Keim and Zeithaml 1986). Such collaborations not only 
bring mutual benefits from knowledge transfer between organisations, but they also 
facilitate the creation of new knowledge and produce synergistic solutions (Hardy 
et al. 2003). Moreover, relational strategies and tactics such as collective networks, 
business associations’ participation, and stakeholder cooperation enable firms to 
anticipate possible future issues or changes in the nonmarket environment, detect-
ing a potential nonmarket threat or opportunity. While relational strategies antici-
pate firms’ future needs and plans, transactional strategies emphasize more urgent 
needs over planning for the future (Hiatt et al. 2015). Transactional strategies and 
tactics are represented as issue-specific and reactive deeds of a non-repetitive nature. 
They are characterised by arm’s-length ties and are undertaken on an ad-hoc basis 
(Mahon et al. 2004), thus leading to self-interest motivated conduct without network 
building purposes (Kaufmann 1998; Uzzi 1997).
This strategy type represents a reactive response to changes in the nonmarket 
environment, undertaken only when the management is forced to act due to visible 
effects on the firm. Reacting to things that happen, rather than making things hap-
pen, is generally characteristic of transactional strategies and tactics. Transactional 
nonmarket strategies and tactics may include issue-lobbying, temporary grassroots 
mobilisation of employees, suppliers or customers, advocacy advertising, contract-
ing media experts, press releases and press conferences. The resources for such 
strategies and tactics are mobilised provisionally to deal with a certain event or to 
accomplish a specific (image or reputation) target (Hillman and Hitt 1999). Trans-
actional strategies and tactics are often used by firms to fine-tune or complement 
relational ones. Additionally, in particular situations, when it is not possible to use 
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relational strategies and tactics due to legislation and regulation, then firms can only 
rely on transactional actions (van Kranenburg et al. 2012). Relational and transac-
tional nonmarket strategies can be concurrently implemented; thus, firms can make 
intertwined and simultaneous use of these two broad types of nonmarket strategies 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999). Both types of nonmarket strategies consist of the infor-
mation, financial incentive, and constituency-building strategies and their related 
tactics (such as lobbying, campaign contributions, grassroots mobilization etc.) or 
a configuration of these strategies and tactics, although the form, intensity, and fre-
quency of use differ between both types of nonmarket strategies (Hillman and Hitt 
1999; Holburn and Van den Bergh 2004; Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Schuler 1996; 
Schuler et al. 2002).
2.3  Nonmarket Institutions
A plethora of nonmarket institutions influence firms formally, through laws and reg-
ulation, and informally, through social pressure, activism and efforts to shape the 
public perception of business. Political institutions, regulatory and standards agen-
cies, and social institutions such as the media and interest groups have emerged, 
each unravelling a different societal need and resolving political, social, or economic 
issues. The pressures of these institutions consist of different drivers. The response 
of firms to an institutional pressure depends on how these firms perceive the impact, 
power and importance of these drivers. The following section outlines the main 
drivers of each institutional pressure and how firms respond to these pressures.
2.4  Political Institutions
Political institutions are organizations which create, enforce, and apply laws; that 
mediate conflict; make (governmental) policy on the economy and social systems; 
and otherwise provide representation for the populous. All formal and informal pro-
visions, rules and norms that guide the political decision-making process together 
form the system of political institutions. Political institutions are reflections of a 
nation’s culture, its aspirations, and its history, and these institutions also play a role 
in shaping government’s policies. The term political institutions may also refer to 
the recognized structure of rules and principles within which firms operate, includ-
ing such concepts as the right to vote, responsible government, and accountability. 
These institutions, formal and informal, determine both the constraints and incen-
tives faced by key actors in a given society (Börner 2005). Political institutions have 
the power to affect the legal and economic environment (Shenkar and Luo 2008). 
They can enact and enforce laws thereby influencing the legal environment and 
with the coercive power they can let firms adopt certain practices or policies. They 
also set monetary and tax policies, price controls, and intellectual property regu-
lations and they also influence labor relations, trade policies, capital and exchange 
controls, and transfer pricing policies (Shenkar and Luo 2008). Moreover, political 
institutions efficiently reduce transaction costs in the political processes. Given the 
endogenous feature of political institutions and the strategic allocation of powers 
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they provide, appropriately chosen institutions can help the development of credible 
mechanisms capable of decreasing risks of opportunistic behavior of political and 
economic actors (Börner 2005).
Political institutions thus also represent nonmarket arrangements, which offer 
instances of public authority and public policy related issues, costs and benefits, 
affecting firms that participate in the political arena (Choi et  al. 2014; Weingast 
1995). Political institutions are closely associated with forms of government (Pers-
son 2002) and politics may be attractive for firms, provided that the political arena 
grants opportunities for achieving favourable policy outcomes (Bonardi et al. 2005; 
Grossman and Helpman 1996). In general, firms tend to get involved in the politi-
cal arena when policy outcomes affect their businesses or in order to obtain benefi-
cial policy outcomes (Masters and Keim 1985). Similarly to economic markets, for 
which industry attractiveness justifies the entry of firms, firms get involved in the 
political nonmarket arena and interact with political institutions when policies are 
attractive or when they may affect their business operations (Choi et al. 2014). The 
political pressure results from the salience of political issues and the costs and ben-
efits of engaging in politics (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).
Saliency refers to public awareness of a specific issue in which firms also have an 
interest (Bonardi et al. 2006). If the issues for which firms seek to obtain favourable 
policy outcomes have little salience (low public interest), firms enjoy a relatively 
strong advantage in shaping final decisions (McCubbins et al. 1987). These greater 
chances for success in their political endeavours increase their nonmarket political 
incentives.
Efforts to develop strategies to mitigate policies that might develop into a sali-
ent issue also offer venues for nonmarket action (Hillman and Keim 1995; Laffont 
1996). For example, responding to an issue before it becomes politicised or widely 
salient may enable the firm to resolve that issue to its benefit, depending on its life 
cycle (Bigelow et  al. 1993). Firms that delay their responses can lose substantial 
decision-making discretion, because over time, legislation gets crafted and regula-
tions enforced. Because policy issues also derive from firms’ agendas, firms can 
best advance policy through regular interactions with institutions and the building of 
long-term relationship networks (Choi et al. 2014), hiring people with government 
experience or who have held political positions in governmental bodies, as well as 
people who have made other contributions (Dean and Brown 1995) outside the mar-
ket (Baum et al. 2000; Benton and Daly 1991; Buchanan 1980). Such efforts, on the 
part of firms, in obtaining desirable policy outcomes represent the costs of politics 
or political involvement (Laffont 1996). If desired policy outcomes can be achieved 
with diffused costs and then can lead to concentrated benefits, firms will find politics 
and political actions more attractive (Glynn and Abzug 2002).
Hence, decisions and activities of political institutions have real economic 
implications for firms. They establish the rules of economic exchange, make par-
ticular actions subject to penalties, and can increase the cost of business activities 
(Hiatt et  al. 2015). The nonmarket strategy literature has generally asserted that 
firms become political active for the purpose of obtaining favourable public poli-
cies (White et al. 2017). Bushman et al. (2004) find that firms are more transparent 
and share information in economies with lower state influence and strong political 
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institutions. Higher transparency and more sharing of information reduce the cost of 
business activities. Building a strong network with political institutions helps firms 
to increase the transparency and to share information. In addition, this network can 
provide firms with unique information about political processes that are often dif-
ficult and expensive to obtain (Frynas et  al. 2006). A strong network of relations 
with political institutions also helps firms to find and develop political resources and 
capabilities to deal with issues and also to find patterns of behaviour in a specific 
environment (Bonardi et al. 2006; Lawton et al. 2013). Obtaining political capital 
enables firms to be more effective in the political and social processes and may ulti-
mately lead to improved performance. For instance, White et al. (2017) stress that 
there is a relationship between firm’s perception of the impact of pressures from 
political institutions and the intensification of political ties. Ties are characterized by 
the degree of frequency of interaction between partners and their time and resource 
commitment (Rowley et al. 2000). Strong ties involve more time and resource com-
mitment and have higher frequency of interactions than weak ties. Weak ties are 
cheaper to form and easier to maintain than stronger ties. However, strong ties 
enhance trust, the sharing of more and specific knowledge and information, mutual 
gain, reciprocity, and a long-term perspective (Larson 1992). These strong ties with 
political institutions provide firms with a more in-depth understanding of pending 
political events or social impact, and may develop goodwill (Doh et al. 2012). Given 
the importance of the salience of political issues, the costs of politics and to obtain 
favourable public policy, firms’ nonmarket actions focus mainly on relational strate-
gies and tactics. This leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The pressure of political institutions is manifested through the 
salience of political issues and the costs of politics.
Hypothesis 1b: The pressure of political institutions positively contributes to 
firms’ use of more relational strategies than transactional strategies.
2.5  Regulatory Agencies
With the purpose of protecting society from market failures such as monopolies 
and concentrations, some regulations are needed for the market environment (Ogus 
2002). These market failures are not solved by private law and therefore political 
institutions need to set the rules of the game. They can develop laws and regulations. 
Regulations, on the other hand, are standards and rules adopted by administrative 
agencies that govern how laws will be enforced. Regulations can be divided into two 
types: Social and economic (Ogus 2002; Voinea and van Kranenburg 2017). The 
goal of social regulations is consumer protection, environmental protection, health 
and safety. Regulatory actions such as information disclosure, mandatory stand-
ards and licensing are important instruments to secure these social goals. Economic 
regulation, in contrast, is needed when there is insufficient or unfair competition. It 
consists of legal measures that control, for instance, the price and quality of products 
and services (Ogus 2002).
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Regulatory agencies are public establishments that exercise autonomous statutory 
authority over specific areas of activities, with a regulatory or supervisory capacity 
(Scott 2013). They perform their functions with oversight from the legislative part 
of the executive branch of the government. They cover administrative law and rule-
making codifying and enforcing rules, imposing supervision or oversight. Some reg-
ulatory agencies also perform audits, while others are authorised to impose punitive 
measures on relevant parties (Kanter 1999). Regulatory agencies commonly oversee 
the use of public goods, ensuring the fair distribution of social welfare, or regulat-
ing activities of organisations, institutions, and firms (North 1990). These agencies 
operate independently from other branches or arms of the government. They can 
develop policies to achieve their goals and tasks. These policies may differ in the 
timing of their effectiveness (Motta 1994). An important factor for successful social 
and economic regulations and policies are regulatory agencies that have a reputation 
of acting fairly (Stern 1997). Effective regulatory agencies provide transparency and 
predictability. The effectiveness of regulatory agencies is positively related to the 
degree of independence of these agencies from their external environment (Voinea 
and van Kranenburg 2017). Hence, to serve the regulatory objective, regulatory 
agencies should offer perfect transparency, enjoy complete autonomy in their regula-
tory progression and practice and engage in consistent proceedings both over time 
and designated locations (Lewis and Sappington 1991). These traits all have posi-
tive connotations, though in practice, some deficiencies in transparency, autonomy 
and consistency characterise virtually all regulatory agencies (Keim and Zeithaml 
1986; Lewis and Sappington 1991). Insufficient transparency would lead to infor-
mation asymmetries or to knowledge gaps related to policy outcomes with strong 
implications for firms’ operations (Holburn and Van den Bergh 2004). Through rela-
tional actions (i.e. networks or business associations) firms can build social capital, 
decreasing the information gap and liability caused by the imperfect transparency in 
regulatory processes (Zaheer 1995). Furthermore, through collective networks firms 
can also achieve information transfers and joint problem-solving arrangements (Hill-
man and Hitt 1999; Keim and Baysinger 1988).
When national regulatory institutions lack complete autonomy for establishing, 
promulgating and implementing rules and regulations, a heritage of state inter-
vention, government policy, or excessive regulations persists, heavily constraining 
firms’ activities (Stern and Holder 1999; Suchman 1995). Remnant policies influ-
ence the autonomy of regulatory agencies and in particular the operation of effec-
tive courts, which would enforce proper, consistent rules and regulatory procedures 
(Stern 1997). Insufficient autonomy is also manifest, as pervasiveness or abuses of 
power, defined as the firms’ likelihood to encounter abuses of power during nor-
mal interactions within actors in market and nonmarket environment (Bardhan 
1997; Treisman 2000). The degree to which abuses of power are regular, signifi-
cantly influences economic and non-economic firm activities, creating opportuni-
ties to internalise environmental threats through absorption (Ring et al. 1990) or to 
purchase facilitating services and favourable regulatory decisions (Ang and Cum-
mings 1997; Boddewyn and Brewer 1994). For firms, managing the abuse of power 
(or mitigating its effects) represents a nonmarket target, achieved through various 
nonmarket relational actions, such as increasing interactions and collaboration with 
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local and national actors in order to decrease the pervasiveness of abuse in transac-
tions (Rodriguez et al. 2006).
A kind of mutual dependency relationship exists between regulatory agencies and 
the firms they regulate. Regulatory agencies must base their decisions on informa-
tion, but most of the information is confidential and firm-specific. These agencies 
partly depend on the information provided by firms to make legitimate and accept-
able decisions. Therefore, providing specific information is the most tactical strategy 
regulated firms can use while trying to influence regulatory agencies (Holburn and 
Van den Bergh 2008).
The pressure of regulatory agencies increases when regulatory actions and prom-
ulgations reflect a temporary issue-related perspective. A temporary issue perspec-
tive increases the complexity of the regulatory framework and makes it more dif-
ficult for firms to grasp future developments. Relational nonmarket strategies and 
tactics might increase in response to the possible repercussions of a temporarily 
issue regulatory outlook, such that firms might hire specialists to gain insight into 
certain regulatory aspects and awareness of regulatory processes. Hence, manag-
ing the pressure exerted by regulatory agencies, firms can use relational nonmarket 
actions (e.g., collective networks, business association participation, partnerships 
with likeminded firms), in order to compensate for their information gaps and other 
liabilities given by promulgations with a temporarily issue perspective, by insuffi-
cient transparency or by the lack of autonomy of regulators (Boddewyn and Brewer 
1994; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman et al. 2004; Mahon et al. 2004). Given the 
importance of independence, fairness and transparency of these agencies, they are 
generally reluctant to have long-term relationships with firms. Moreover, given the 
focus of regulatory agencies on administration, monitoring, and enforcement, firms’ 
nonmarket actions focus mainly on transactional strategies and tactics. Therefore, 
we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2a: The pressure of regulatory agencies is explained by insufficient 
transparency, insufficient autonomy and temporarily issue perspectives on 
rules and regulations.
Hypothesis 2b: The pressure of regulatory agencies positively contributes to 
firms’ use of more transactional actions than relational actions.
2.6  Standards Agencies
Whereas regulatory agencies establish rules and objectives for various groups, a 
specific group of agencies act as mediators, implementing the regulatory require-
ments. These standards agencies mainly focus on the social goal. Regulatory means 
such as information disclosure, mandatory standards and licensing are important 
instruments to secure these social goals. Thus, in addition to regulatory pressures, 
firms must acquiesce to standards, obtain licenses and obey principles or customs 
imposed in the business setting (McCubbins et al. 1987). Therefore, standards agen-
cies become important nonmarket institutions, functioning to ensure social loss 
abatement or loss abatement for firms (Palmer et al. 1993). Social loss abatement 
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entails minimising firms’ activities, if they generate health or safety hazards that 
are detrimental to the public interest. It also implies optimising the degree of loss 
imposed by the administrative or other compliance costs associated with regulations 
(Ogus 2002).
Standards agencies establish and define measures to be taken by firms, before 
they may enter regulated business arenas. They also frame firms’ activities, through 
prior approval requirements, mandatory standards and information disclosures 
(input or output prohibitions) (Rao et al. 2001). Information disclosure requirements 
demand that firms reveal adequate information regarding their quality and safety 
practices, in order to help customers exercise their preferences. Information disclo-
sure also helps to avoid the welfare losses that result when consumers are deprived 
of choice (Shaffer 1995). Firms might be allowed to select the manner in which they 
disclose information, as long as it matches the imposed standards of the institutional 
setting (Lenway and Murtha 1994).
Prior approval, in contrast, obliges firms to obtain a license or permit from the 
authorised institutions before they may lawfully engage in an activity or supply a 
product or service. To obtain such authorisation, firms usually must fulfil optimal 
loss abatement requirements or meet other conditions that imply extra costs (Ang 
and Cummings 1997; Meznar and Nigh 1995). The costs to comply with standards 
and obtain permits and licenses are the direct results of imposed criteria; they are 
often high or seem to represent unjustified standards (De Soto 2000; Ogus 2002). 
Expenditures for fulfilling these requirements thus appear peripheral or ground-
less to firms and, in response, firms may seek to decrease what they perceive to be 
unnecessary expenditures through transactional nonmarket actions, such as lobbying 
for the abrogation of standards (De Soto 2000; Oliver 1991) or temporary mobilisa-
tion of employees, suppliers and customers; advocacy advertising; public relations 
and press conferences (Hillman and Hitt 1999). Firms might try to identify, edu-
cate and motivate action groups or stakeholders affected by the same norms. Fur-
thermore, given the focus of standards agencies on administration and enforcement 
firms’ nonmarket actions focus on contesting rules and requirements, disguising 
nonconformity and damage control (Oliver 1991). In this sense, the pressures from 
standards agencies, manifested through additional organisational costs to meet vari-
ous requirements should increase nonmarket transactional actions of the firm and we 
therefore hypothesise:
Hypothesis 3a: The pressure of standards agencies is manifested through the 
costs to obtain permits and licenses and the costs to comply with imposed 
standards.
Hypothesis 3b: The pressure of standards agencies positively contributes to 
firms’ use of more transactional actions than relational actions.
2.7  Interest Groups
Interest groups are organised collections of individuals motivated by social and eth-
ical concerns which aim to advance a broad set of interests. Interest groups seek 
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to influence business practices, firm and industry practices, as well as political and 
economic decisions (Ades and DiTella 1999; Baron 1999; Pacheco et  al. 2014). 
Interest groups are thus collections of individuals that engage in collective action 
to achieve some desirable end that they could not attain by acting alone (Teegen 
et al. 2004). They have great loyalty to certain ideals (their reason for existence), and 
they actively voice these ideals to among other firms, governments, policy-makers, 
politicians, and media in order to influence firm- or business practices and policy 
discourses in line with the groups’ demands and ideals (Teegen et al. 2004; Wapner 
1995).
Interest groups can influence the perception or assumption of whether the actions 
of a firm are desirable or appropriate according to a socially constructed system of 
norms, value, beliefs, and definitions within a society. For instance, interest groups 
can erode a firm’s market value, destroy its brand, destabilize employee morale, con-
strain its influence with various constituencies and limit its scope for strategic action 
(Yaziji and Doh 2009). A wide variety of active interest groups focus predominantly 
on post-material, nonmarket issues, such as consumer concerns, environmentalism 
and minority rights, rather than on economic issues, such as import duties, human 
resource training, or farm price support (Haveman 1993; Pacheco et al. 2014). Gen-
erally, interest groups start social movements and, as a result, achieve their goals 
by gaining public support (Bonardi et al. 2006; Dasgupta et al. 1979). Their capac-
ity to influence public opinion is their greatest power and the primary indicator of 
the amount of pressure the group is able to exert on decision makers. The extent to 
which an interest group can make a specific matter salient is referred to as saliency 
capacity (Buchanan 1980; Vachani et al. 2009).
Interest groups express collective concerns and interests and have a broad influ-
ence, shaping social, economic and political systems to promote a given set of 
values and ideas, whereas the economic advocacy activities of interest groups are 
relevant for the business environment (Chandler 2013; Mahon et al. 2004; Teegen 
2003). Interest group advocacy on economic issues may result in a change in public 
attitudes. For example, what was acceptable corporate behavior in the past, may no 
longer be acceptable now and what is acceptable now may not be in the future.
To manage pressures from interest groups, firms try to incorporate issues of con-
cern into their long-term mission statements or transform their (core) values to reach 
collective goals, as well as implementing other activities or programs aimed at better 
aligning firm activities with the collective concerns of interest groups (Landes and 
Posner 1975; Pacheco et al. 2014).
Recent decades, the influence of interest groups on the legitimacy and per-
formance of firms has increased. The rising influence of interest groups can be 
explained by increasing social and political freedom, the emergence of the welfare 
state, the shift in social systems of values and societal conceptions, and by develop-
ments in information technology (Yaziji and Doh 2009). Nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) are a special type of interest group. The 1970s and 1980s were 
witness to an explosive growth in the number of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), yet not until the 1990s did the organizations become publicly recognized 
as a sector rather than individual activist organizations (Marberg et al. 2016). Differ-
ent interest groups operate under different ideologies and will have different targets. 
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These different ideologies, norms and values result in the use of various influence 
tactics to support interest group claims towards firms. For instance, NGOs can use 
a confrontational approach or an engaging approach (Winston 2002). NGOs which 
use the first approach tend to employ moral stigmatization, or ‘naming and sham-
ing’, as their primary tactic while NGOs that favor the engaging approach offer dia-
logue in order to persuade firms by means of ethical and prudential arguments to 
adopt voluntary codes of conduct and limited forms of cooperation (Voinea and van 
Kranenburg 2017).
As a consequence of these developments, firms capitalise on building a strong 
reputation and a sense of being legitimate, by managing the normative pressures 
imposed by interest groups (Campbell 2007; Chandler 2013; Vachani et al. 2009), 
by adapting to the guidelines proposed by interest groups (Bonardi and Keim 2005), 
as well as by monitoring specific business functions to achieve a socially responsi-
ble reputation (Baron and Diermeier 2007; Vachani et al. 2009). Given the fact that 
interest groups focus on nonmarket issue identification and saliency development, 
firms prefer more to use nonmarket relational strategies to shape collective values 
and criteria, and to balance expectations (Teegen 2003). Therefore, we advance the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a: The level of pressure exerted by interest groups on firms is 
determined by their capacity to gain favourable public opinion and economic 
advocacy concerns.
Hypothesis 4b: The pressure of interest groups positively relate to firms’ use of 
more relational actions than transactional strategies.
2.8  Media
Another social nonmarket institution that is becoming of growing importance to 
firms is the media (Asp 2014; Hennig-Thurau et  al. 2010; Kaplan and Haenlein 
2010; Voinea and van Kranenburg 2017). This institution consists of multiple medi-
ums, which refers to any means, agency or instrument of communication (Danesi 
2000). The media encompass all goal-oriented technical means or instruments for 
the procurement of information in print, visual, or auditory forms as well as the 
organizational and institutional entities behind them that generate and provide this 
information. The information is directed at a broad and public audience (Wirtz et al. 
2011). The role of the media can be divided into three core parts (Asp 2014; Baron 
and Diermeier 2007; Hunter et  al. 2013). Firstly, the media act as powerful inde-
pendent institutions constraining actions and shaping both individual and organiza-
tional behavior (Asp 2014). Secondly, the media in their dependent role alert the 
public, activist, interest groups and government on issues that concern firms’ busi-
ness activities. Thirdly, the media are used by other institutions such as the govern-
ment, activists and interest groups to alert the public of firms misdoings. Hence, 
the media alert the public, activists, interest groups and government of market and 
nonmarket issues, raising concerns about firms’ practices and reducing the costs of 
collective nonmarket actions, through their influence and power over public opinion 
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or society at large (Bardoel and d’Haenens 2004). The media continuously shape 
public opinion and have a central role in educating, informing and empowering the 
public, regarding social responsibility and sustainable development (Shaffer and 
Hillman 2000). As a nonmarket institution, the media can also influence organi-
sational activities by affecting firms’ reputation and ethical status, and by placing 
firms’ activities under the scrutiny of other market and nonmarket institutions.
Although the media can significantly influence firm activity, their roles are nei-
ther fixed nor well-defined. The roles are not only determined, implemented and 
interpreted by the owners and managers, but also by legislature, government admin-
istrative agencies, judicial institutions, public sentiment and ethical consensus. Fur-
thermore, the legitimacy claim of the media is of mixed nature, as the media can 
take on a dependent role as well as an independent role (Asp 2014; Fassin 2009). 
Therefore, credibility is the central determinant of the media’s influence on business 
and society (Bucy 2003), stemming from perceptions of media ‘believability’, accu-
racy, bias, fairness and information completeness (Johnson and Kaye 1998). The 
concern for the public interest stems from the media’s role in terms of informing 
the public and uncovering malpractice and corruption at all levels of society, hold-
ing governments and businesses accountable for their actions, related to both market 
and nonmarket issues (Bardoel and d’Haenens 2004; Landes and Posner 1975). For 
firms, the media can also amplify or reduce uncertainty by providing information, 
presenting facts and events, changes in legislation, exploring their potential sig-
nificance and ramifications and advocating possible courses of actions (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).
The media are considered one of the primary sources for the general public to 
learn about firms beyond those that they have relationships with (Carroll 2009; 
Deephouse 2000). Media inform the public about issues and present an overall eval-
uation of the firm (Deephouse 2000). Newsworthiness of a firm’s activities along 
with its performance, the diversity of its responses, its communication effort, time, 
and memory decay determine the firm’s image and thus its reputation (Garbett 
1988). Due to the media’s pervasiveness and agenda-setting power, the media can 
play a significant role in a firm’s reputation. Studies show a relationship between 
media exposure and firm’s reputation (Wartick 1992). The effect of media exposure 
on reputation depends on situational factors such as source credibility and firm’s 
responses (Griffin et  al. 1991). For instance, the media generally cover issues of 
firms of great social significance, characterised by great public interest and con-
cern, such as malpractice and unethical business behaviour. The potential for media 
coverage puts pressure on firms to achieve more open, transparent business prac-
tices, as well as to address their ethics of their nonmarket behaviour, with respect to 
business practices and stakeholders (Bardhan 1997). Media coverage can also con-
tribute to firms’ awareness of the likelihood of encountering corruption in normal 
interactions (Bardhan 1997; Treisman 2000), and the inherent degree of ambiguity 
associated with transactions. When the media have high credibility and strong soci-
etal influence, firms make use of this to build relationship networks with the media, 
in order to improve their image and reputation. Firms can also use regular press 
releases and media interviews to present their views and motivations, casting issues 
in particular light. This kind of framing can also shape audiences’ assessment of a 
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firm’s reputation and practices (Bansal and Clelland 2004). However, frames are not 
fixed and issues can be reframed over time. Bach and Blake (2016, p. 66) stress that 
“framing is a powerful strategic tool that enables firms to shape the structure of the 
nonmarket environment to their advantage”.
In recent years, due to information and communication technological develop-
ments, the traditional and new media have become integrated into a contempo-
rary socially-networked multi-channel platform. As a result, the new media land-
scape has become more complex and uncertain, speed of sharing information has 
increased, and controlling the information sharing process has become more difficult 
(Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Building a network with various media organizations 
can help firms to deal with the new situation and develop the needed nonmarket cap-
ital. Firms should build ongoing relationships with journalists and media sources.
Furthermore, a mutual resource dependency relationship exists between media 
and firms (van Kranenburg 2017). As Picard (2013, p. 49) pointed out, “the fun-
damental problem for news providers is that news itself has never been financially 
viable as a market-based good. It has always been primarily financed by arrange-
ments based on income derived from sources other than selling news to consumers”. 
Therefore, many media firms are operating in two markets: Readers and advertisers 
markets. Media organizations depend on the advertising income derived from firms. 
They need to ensure that there is an audience for their advertisers. Hence, they need 
to focus on news values and market driven values such as profitability and maximiz-
ing readership. Therefore, media organizations also prefer a long-term relationship 
with firms in order to secure access to financial sources. Thus, firms exploit media 
credibility and its influence for their organisational benefit (reputation building), 
through different relational strategies and tactics, such as building long term rela-
tionships with media institutions. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5a: The pressure of the media is determined by its high credibility, 
high societal influence and concern for public interest.
Hypothesis 5b: The pressure of the media is positively related to firms’ use of 
more relational actions than transactional strategies.
3  Methodology
3.1  Context, Sample and Data
An empirical study was conducted amongst managing directors of multinational 
corporations operating in the Netherlands, by means of a postal questionnaire sur-
vey. As it is a small, industrialised country with an open, integrated economy and a 
founding member of the European Union (EU), the Netherlands embraces the Polder 
Model, which seeks consensus policies in economics, consensus in decision mak-
ing, pragmatic recognition of pluriformity and cooperation, despite the differences 
between various actors. Specifically, the Polder Model focuses on tripartite coopera-
tion amongst employers’ organisations, labour unions and the government, leading 
to lengthy negotiations, as well as a host of rules and regulations characteristic of a 
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welfare state. Hence, the Dutch economy has the characteristics of both a regulated 
market economy with a large social security system and a shareholder capitalism 
economy aimed at maximizing profits, although the Rhineland model still domi-
nates. The Netherlands can be described as a corporatist country.
Because the Netherlands was among the countries that initiated the European 
Customs Union in 1957, the economy has also benefited from the early establish-
ment of substantial economic integration. Its membership in the EU helps coun-
teract the adverse effects of its small size by extending its domestic market. The 
Netherlands has become one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the world, and with its favourable location and active role within the EU, 
foreign firms choose it strategically as a host country. In 2012, foreign MNEs deliv-
ered a turnover of €366 billion, representing 30% of the total turnover in the Nether-
lands. Furthermore, the sample population accounted for 21% of overall investments 
and for 22% of the investments in research and development (Netherlands Foreign 
Investment Agency 2012).
The Netherlands is home to some strong competitive sectors internationally, in 
particular food and beverage, petroleum and chemicals, and transportation, although 
it also has robust finance, insurance, and service sectors. The most important service 
sectors include business services (a very broad category covering employment agen-
cies, translators, cleaning and real estate for business, but also the distribution of 
electricity, water, gas and other oil products), construction services (which includes 
not only house construction, but also infrastructure and dredging), and postal ser-
vices (Hogenbirk et al. 2009). The political and economic climate in the Netherlands 
makes it an interesting case to explore how firms perceive the pressures from vari-
ous national institutions and their drivers and how they respond to these pressures. It 
is important to note that political campaign contributions are prohibited in the Neth-
erlands. Therefore, firms can only use the information and the consistency-building 
strategies and their related tactics.
Several databases were used for this study: The Dun and Bradstreet database, 
Osiris, Political Constraint Index Dataset (Henisz 2011) and the Dow Douglas Psy-
chic Distance Stimuli (Dow Douglas 2012). In addition, we collected data by using 
a postal survey sent to among managing directors of foreign firms in the Netherlands 
during the summer of 2011. In total, 800 multinational corporations were selected 
from the Dun and Bradstreet (2010) database. To improve our survey and to address 
the non-response bias, we also conducted 17 in-depth interviews with firms’ manag-
ers and discussed the survey items and tested for non-response bias. It is important 
to understand the effects of non-response bias because bias jeopardizes the accu-
racy of estimates derived from surveys and thus the ability to draw inferences about 
a general population from the sample (Sax et  al. 2003). To test for non-response 
bias we employed two techniques: (a) We compared early and late returns but spot-
ted no significant differences in responses regarding key constructs; (b) we used the 
so called non-response follow up; that is, we systematically contacted respondents 
either by phone and inquired about main constructs or through face-to-face meet-
ings and in-depth interviews. Through interviews we used participant comments and 
suggestions to revise the survey and assess the non-response bias. The information 
collected from the non-respondents through the follow-up technique did not differ 
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significantly from the respondents. Subsequently, we carried out a pilot survey to 
evaluate the revised survey instrument.
The returned responses totalled 160 foreign MNEs (25% of the sample group) 
operating in the Netherlands and originating from 22 home countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In addition, we also collected 
data among managing directors of domestic firms during the spring of 2012. The 
questionnaire was sent to 400 medium and large domestic companies in the Nether-
lands. After sending two reminders, the total number of returned responses was 40.
3.2  Method
Due to the novelty and interpretation flexibility of the nonmarket field, nonmarket 
variables can be measured through different manifest indicators; structural equa-
tion modelling (SEM) is an appropriate method for the field. Furthermore, we used 
partial least squares path modelling (PLS), as implemented in SmartPLS 3.0, to 
assess the reliability and validity of measurement, to estimate the model coefficients 
and to test the hypotheses. It is a widely accepted variance-based, descriptive and 
prediction-oriented approach to structural equation modelling and can be applied 
for exploratory and confirmatory research (Chin et  al. 2003; Hair et  al. 2012). A 
PLS path model is composed of a structural component specifying the relation-
ships between latent variables and a measurement part, specifying the relationships 
between latent variables and their observed or manifest variables. PLS focuses on 
maximising the dependent variables’ variance that the independent variables can 
explain. Furthermore, as PLS accommodates models combining formative and 
reflective constructs, it is recommended for analysing small to medium size samples.
3.3  Measurement
All exogenous constructs are operationalised by means of formative multi-item 
scales. All indicators were measured on a 5-point rating scale, with ’1’ represent-
ing the lowest level and ’5’ the highest. Based on the literature, we used two items 
to measure the pressure of political institutions: Salience of political issues and the 
costs of political involvement (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Bonardi et al. 2006). Three 
items were used to measure the exogenous variable pressure of regulatory agencies: 
Insufficient transparency of rules and regulations, insufficient autonomy of regula-
tory institutions and short-term perspectives on rules and regulations (Bardhan 
1997; Stern and Holder 1999; Suchman 1995; Treisman 2000).
To measure pressure of standards agencies, we used the costs for obtaining 
permits, licenses and authorisations and the costs to comply with standards (Ogus 
2002; Rao et al. 2001). For the construct pressure of interest groups, we used eco-
nomic advocacy concerns and capacity to influence public opinion (Bonardi et al. 
2006; Buchanan 1980; Vachani et  al. 2009). Regarding pressure of the media, we 
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measured credibility, societal influence and concern for public interest (Bardoel and 
d’Haenens 2004; Bucy 2003; Haley 1996).
The endogenous construct nonmarket strategies involves reflective measure-
ment. It is constructed from the questionnaire survey. Survey questions measured 
whether each firm uses a transactional or relational nonmarket strategy. We used 
the information, financial incentive, and constituency-building strategies and their 
related tactics defined by Hillman and Hitt (1999) to select the items. Based on a 
5-point scale ranging from ’never used’ (indicating various possible actions specific 
to transactional behavior) to ’continuously used’ tactics, specific to relational strate-
gies (Nell et al. 2015). The inquiring tactics are as follows: Business associations’ 
participation; partnerships to influence political issues; interest groups’ awareness 
and networks; lobbying; supply of technical reports to regulators; press releases; 
testimonies in expert hearings; contributions to political parties; presence of firm’s 
members in political parties; employing people with political experience; employee 
training for trade union participation; employee training for media relations; devel-
opment of an internal prevention system; development of an internal monitoring 
system; proactive self-changing and regulation; building socially responsible repu-
tations; challenging government regulations; interaction with local governments; 
interaction with national government; active cooperation with Dutch institutions; ad-
hoc cooperation with Dutch institutions; having a clearly established set of tactics to 
deal with Dutch institutions; providing local or national government with products 
or services. The frequency of use determines whether the item is part of relational 
or transactional strategies. Although the types of proactive nonmarket strategies are 
classified into two broad categories, the use of one type of nonmarket strategy does 
not preclude the use of another. Firms can use both types of strategies simultane-
ously (Hillman and Hitt 1999).
3.4  Controls
3.4.1  Firm Level
The resources available to respond to nonmarket issues may also influence the type 
of nonmarket strategies (Hillman et al. 2004; Lawton et al. 2013). In addition, firms 
with a large resource and employment base have more assets at risk, which means 
that they might be more affected by changes related to legislation, regulations and 
standards (Masters and Keim 1985). Moreover, large firms are generally more inter-
dependent in terms of a variety of institutions (Meznar and Nigh 1995). We meas-
ured size as the number of employees of each firm in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, a firm’s experience with institutions is considered an indication of 
possible network and social capital. More experience may facilitate certain types 
of nonmarket strategies, including building networks or cooperation with local and 
national governments (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Keim and Baysinger 1988; Keim and 
Zeithaml 1986). Since the experience of a firm might relate to the type of nonmarket 
strategy, we considered it as a control variable, measured by the age of the firm.
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3.4.2  Industry Level
Institutional factors specific to regulatory agencies ensure reforms in the regulated 
industries in which firms operate (Keim and Baysinger 1988). Regulatory agencies 
also ensure third-party control in some industries, to avoid or penalise anti-compe-
tition behaviour. The relational and transactional nonmarket strategies undertaken 
by firms can thus differ across industries and we therefore controlled for possible 
industry effects with industry dummies: Manufacturing, Services and Utilities. 
The category Manufacturing includes the following industries: Chemical products; 
extraction and processing of non-energy minerals (2.5% of the final sample); metal 
manufacturing; mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering; office and data 
process machinery (43% of the final sample); manufacturing of food, drinks and 
tobacco; textiles; clothing; paper; rubber and plastic (18.0% of the final sample). 
The category Services includes retail and distribution; hotels; catering; repairs (6.5% 
of the final sample); transport and communication (9% of the final sample); bank-
ing; finance; insurance; business services (consultancies, PR and advertising) (13% 
of the final sample). The category Utilities includes energy and water (8% of the 
final sample).
3.4.3  Country Level
To explore institutional pressures more broadly and to expand the range of institu-
tional issues, we included in our model a broader designation of institutional pres-
sures that is, socio-cultural institutional pressures and political system pressures. 
MNEs from particular contexts have more experience or are used to particular types 
of nonmarket strategies. Therefore, the variables socio-cultural pressures and politi-
cal system pressures incorporate possible country effects on the type of nonmarket 
strategy used by firms. The variable socio-cultural pressures captures the difference 
between the home and host country-designated socio-cultural factors, which affect 
the flows of information between firm and environment; this is measured as the 
difference between home and host country index estimates, provided by Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006).
The variable political system pressures measures the difference between home 
and host political constraints and identifies the difference between the underlying 
political structures, measuring their ability to support credible policy commitments. 
The primary source for these estimates was provided by the Political Constraint 
Index Dataset by Henisz (2011).
4  Results
4.1  Evaluation of the Measurement Model
The causal and empirical measurement results are presented in Fig. 1. The central 
criterion for evaluating the SEM was the rate of reliability  (R2) of the latent endog-
enous variable nonmarket strategies; the value of 0.74 suggests the robustness of 
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the measurement model, i.e. the nonmarket institutional effects explain 74% of the 
variance of the latent endogenous variable. The five latent exogenous variables in 
our SEM result from formative measurement models, including respective factors 
and items pertaining to each institution that explain its pressure, as visible in Fig. 1.
According to Chin and Newsted (1999) the evaluation criteria for the manifest 
indicators are the weights of 0.02, 0.05 and 0.35. If such weights are achieved, then 
we can conclude that the latent variables have small, medium and large effect sizes, 
respectively. The evaluation of the empirical results, regarding the formative meas-
urement model, reveals that the theoretically deduced manifest indicators are very 
well suited for the latent variables (Diamantopoulos and Winkelhofer 2001). There-
fore, we analyse first the factors that are underlying the pressures from the various 
institutions and the composition of the nonmarket strategies.
The manifest indicator ‘saliency of policy issues’ offered the highest value (coef-
ficient=0.47; t-value=1.98) in explaining the pressure of political institutions, fol-
lowed by costs of politics (coefficient=0.45; t-value=1.96). The R-square of pressure 
of political institutions equalled 0.74, suggesting that the manifest indicators offer a 
good measurement model for this construct. Thus, we can accept hypothesis H1a. 
The R-square of the exogenous construct pressure of regulatory agencies reached 
0.70, in support of the robustness of the measurement model for this construct. The 
manifest indicator for the ‘short-term perspective of rules and regulations’ offered 
the greatest explanatory value (coefficient 0.54; t-value=1.96) regarding the pres-
sure of regulatory agencies, followed by the item ‘insufficient autonomy of regula-
tory institutions’ (coefficient=0.41; t-value=2.00) and ‘insufficient transparency of 
rules and regulations’ (coefficient=0.29; t-value=1.96); therefore, H2a is accepted.
To explain the pressure of standards agencies, the item ‘costs to comply with 
imposed standards’ achieved the highest value (coefficient=0.56; t-value=2.00), fol-
lowed by the manifest indicator ‘costs to obtain permits, licenses and authorizations’ 
(coefficient=0.48; t-value=1.96). The R-square of this exogenous variable exhibited 
a value of 0.72, confirming the robustness of the measurement model; thus, H3a 
can be accepted. Pressure of interest groups also obtained a robust measurement 
model (R-square=0.74), explained mainly by the item ‘capacity to gain public 
opinion’, with its strong explanatory power (coefficient=0.68; t-value =2.00). The 
other indicator, ‘economic advocacy concerns’, exhibited a lower weight of only 
0.20 (t-value=1.96); nonetheless, H4a can also be accepted. The exogenous vari-
able pressure of the media was mostly explained by the manifest indicator ‘credibil-
ity’, with the highest value of 0.56 (t-value=1.96), followed by ‘societal influence’ 
(coefficient=0.44; t-value=1.96). The item ‘concern for public interest’ (coeffi-
cient=0.24; t-value=1.94) had the smallest explanatory value for this latent con-
struct. The R-square reached 0.68, suggesting that the manifest indicators create a 
good measurement model for this variable and that H5a can be accepted.
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4.2  Evaluation of the Structural Model
The measures of both endogenous and exogenous constructs suggest that our data 
are robust. Furthermore, the correlation statistics between the constructs fall within 
acceptable ranges (Fornell and Bookstein 1982). In Table 1 we present the corre-
lations of the constructs, along with construct-level measurement statistics. The 
results show that the correlations were low for all variables, so multicollinearity was 
not a concern.
Table 2 presents the significance of the interrelations between the manifest and 
latent variables, after using a bootstrapping procedure, which is appropriate for 
determining the significance of the interrelations between the latent endogenous and 
latent exogenous variables (Bollen and Stine 1993; Efron and Tibshirani 1993).
The explanatory value of the relationship between the pressure of political insti-
tutions and firms’ relational actions is relatively low (t-value=1.29; coefficient 0.20); 
therefore, H1b is rejected. The pressure of regulatory agencies has a significant, 
positive effect on the increase in nonmarket transactional strategies, rather than rela-
tional ones undertaken by firms, with a t-value of 2.00 (coefficient 0.35); therefore, 
H2b is accepted. Empirical estimates also show that the pressure of standards agen-
cies exerted a significant effect (t-value=2.02; coefficient 0.35), in terms of increas-
ing nonmarket transactional strategies, therefore we accept H3b.
Further empirical tests offered significant explanatory value regarding the pres-
sure of interest groups; there was an increase in nonmarket relational strategies 
undertaken by firms (t-value=1.96; coefficient 0.28), as determined by the predicted 
manifest indicators. Therefore, we can accept H4b. Finally, with regard to the insti-
tutional pressure of the media, we found that its manifest variables and results indi-
cated significant explanatory value for increased nonmarket relational strategies 
(t-value=1.96; coefficient 0.29), therefore we accept H5b.
Table 2  Results of 
bootstrapping procedure
*Significant 0.1 level; **significant at the 0.05 level
Variables Beta-coefficients T-values
Regulatory agencies 0.35** 2.00
Standards agencies 0.35** 2.02
Political institutions 0.20 1.29
Interest groups 0.28** 1.96
The media 0.29** 1.96
Age 0.20** 2.00
Size 0.30 1.96
Utilities 0.18 1.28
Manufacturing 0.33** 1.96
Services 0.18 1.28
Socio cultural pressures 0.19 1.35
Political system pressures 0.30 1.30
Relational strategies 0.85** 1.96
Transactional strategies 0.67** 1.95
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Regarding the control variables, the age (coefficient=0.20; t-value=2.00) and size 
(coefficient=0.30; t-value=1.96) of the firm had a medium level explanatory power 
in terms of the increase in transactional nonmarket strategies. Moreover, some vari-
ance in nonmarket actions is attributed to the type of industry. The explanatory 
value of firms in the manufacturing industry (t-value=1.95; coefficient 0.33) is sig-
nificant. These firms exhibit an increase in transactional strategies, when dealing 
with institutional influences. With regard to the country level variables, empirical 
testing showed that the difference between home and host country social cultural 
and political designated institutional factors have no significant influence on the type 
of nonmarket strategies.
5  Discussion and Conclusions
Much more than background conditions, nonmarket “institutions determine what 
arrows a MNE has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement nonmar-
ket strategy, and to create competitive advantage” (Ingram and Silverman 2002, p. 
20). Political institutions, regulatory and standards agencies, and social institutions, 
such as the media and interest groups have progressively emerged, each respond-
ing to different societal needs or responding to different market and nonmarket 
issues. MNEs must align with the host institutional environment in order to manage 
political, regulatory social pressures and priorities rather than transplant their home 
nonmarket practices within their network of subsidiaries (Aquilera-Caracuel et  al. 
2012). Despite managerial and academic acknowledgment of the importance of non-
market institutions, complex aspects of the pressures of nonmarket institutions, their 
drivers and their impacts on MNE behaviour remain ambiguous (Dean and Brown 
1995; Doh and Lucea 2013). How MNEs deal with the pressures imposed by non-
market institutions depend on the perceived formal and informal power and obliga-
tions of these institutions. Many previous studies have focused on one or a restricted 
number of nonmarket institutions, but have not included the main institutions that 
MNEs deal with in their host nonmarket environment. In addition, many of these 
studies in the nonmarket strategy field have traditionally focused on the US where 
the institutional context is different than in other developed countries. Our study is 
one of first to investigate simultaneously how MNEs perceive the pressures created 
by various nonmarket institutions in relation to the MNEs nonmarket behavior, and 
to empirically test in a non-US setting the main drivers of the pressures imposed by 
these institutions. The data from this study is from the Netherlands, a small open 
industrialized economy. It can be characterized as a corporatist country.
The extant literature on factors driving institutional pressures and organizational 
responses have been largely developed from different strands of literature. Doh et al. 
(2012) and Mellahi et al. (2016) provide interesting overviews of nonmarket strat-
egy literature in the international business field. Lawton et al. (2013) and Boddewyn 
(2016) provide overviews of the development of corporate political research in the 
international business. However, these excellent studies do not provide an overview 
of the main nonmarket institutions and the drivers that create pressures on MNEs 
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and how MNEs deal with these pressures. Through our study, we attempt to shed 
light on important drivers which elucidate the pressures that nonmarket institutions 
can exert on firms and influence their nonmarket responses. Whilst it is difficult to 
delimitate the drivers, nonetheless the first step is to analyze whether a particular 
institution (outside the market span) still exerts pressure or influence on a firm’s 
activities and triggers an organizational response. If such pressure or influence and 
respective organizational response are supported by empirical evidence, we can then 
include such particular institution under the range of nonmarket institutions.
This study used two dominant, distinct but related institutional perspectives: The 
economic perspective of new institutionalism and the sociological perspective of 
neo institutionalism. These perspectives are generally not combined in the nonmar-
ket strategy field. Doh et al. (2012) stress that integration of institutional and stra-
tegic perspectives provides a logical path to advance nonmarket strategy research. 
Peng et al. (2009) also emphasize the importance of including the institutional per-
spective in studies about firm strategies in the international business field. There-
fore, by taking a broad institutional perspective, this study paired and integrated the 
economic perspective of new institutionalism and the sociological perspective of 
neo  institutionalism with the of corporate political strategy perspective, contribut-
ing to the nonmarket strategy research. We used the corporate political literature to 
define and measure firm nonmarket responses. Our justification for this is that the 
seminal work of Hillman and Hitt (1999) provides an excellent instrument to define 
nonmarket strategies and their related tactics. Hence, this study investigated the 
composition of underlying drivers of pressures of various political, regulatory and 
social institutions in a particular host environment and the preference of firms to use 
transactional or relational strategies–that is the frequency of use of tactics related 
to the specific information, financial incentive, and constituency-building strategies.
Our evidence shows that the pressure of regulatory agencies explained by an 
ad-hoc and temporary issue perspective on rules and regulations and insufficient 
transparency in terms of rules and regulations increase nonmarket transactional 
actions. Firms carry out on an ad-hoc basis interactions with governmental agen-
cies and regulators, given the fact that representatives change constantly and 
no window of opportunity for relationship building is offered (van Kranenburg 
et  al. 2012). Results regarding standards agencies influencing firm activities 
through costs to comply with imposed standards and to obtain permits, licenses 
and authorisations show that standard agencies normalise business activities and 
commonly enforce standards and safety. The vast array of required permits and 
licenses restrict and set boundaries for business practices and activities. When 
these costs seem groundless or unnecessarily high, firms intensify their nonmar-
ket transactional activities in an attempt to reduce them. Furthermore, the pres-
sure of political institutions, explained through the saliency of policy issues and 
the costs of politics only slightly relate to triggering nonmarket relational strate-
gies and tactics. Again, this finding might be explained by a characteristic of the 
environment: in the Netherlands, political involvement on behalf of firms is not 
common practice, nor can policy issue agendas be set easily by businesses (van 
Kranenburg et  al. 2012). Also, as a nonmarket institution, interest groups exert 
influence through their ability to influence public opinion and their economic 
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advocacy concerns, triggering from firms an increase in nonmarket relational 
actions. Thus, firms increase the frequency of their nonmarket relational actions 
to monitor their business functions and augment their accountability within soci-
ety, in an effort to build a reputation for responsibility (Baron and Diermeier 
2007).
Because the media can make or break the image of a firm by empowering the 
public with information about social duties, sustainable growth and various firm 
positions on these matters, firms tend to increase their nonmarket relational actions 
to manage the pressures of the media (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Shaffer and Hillman 
2000).
Furthermore, an interesting finding is that MNEs with a different background 
based on political and social cultural system do seem not to differ in their type of 
response to institutional pressures in a corporatist country like the Netherlands. 
However, MNEs with more experience with the nonmarket context prefer to use 
more transactional strategies than relational ones.
This study shows that domestic firms and MNEs operating in the corporatist 
country the Netherlands both perceived a significant impact of the pressures of the 
main nonmarket institutions on their operations. They respond to these pressures 
with both transactional and/or relational strategies. MNEs employ these proac-
tive strategies simultaneously, although the intensity of use of these tactics differs 
between firms. The intensity of use depends on the age of firms. MNEs considering 
establishing a presence in the Netherlands should begin by implementing relational 
strategies in order to respond to nonmarket pressures. Doing so will likely increase 
their credibility and reputation (van Kranenburg et al. 2017). In addition, becoming 
acquainted with the Dutch context and its profusion of bureaucratic rules and regu-
lations also is necessary as such regulations may limit how newly established MNEs 
learn about and respond to nonmarket institutional pressures in the Netherlands. It 
would be interesting to determine whether the drivers of pressures are perceived 
similarly in other corporatist countries, or whether our findings are specific to the 
Dutch context.
Overall, our study elucidates firms’ managerial proceedings by clarifying which 
institutions are most relevant and can exert regulatory, political or social pressures 
on business activities. Context-specific influences demand consideration in the 
course of strategic choices about the institutional environment, especially if the aim 
is to develop social capital, establish networks and increase responsiveness to—or 
become embedded in—the country’s business setting (Schuler 1996; Shaver 1998; 
Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985). Also, there is a need for theoretical awareness, in 
terms of the fact that not all institutions act as facilitators for the overall business 
environment. Contrary to market institutions, which facilitate business activities, 
nonmarket institutions, which create interdependencies between the market and non-
market arena, may hinder business activities and thus justify the implementation of 
nonmarket actions.
With our work, we have taken a step further towards developing a robust over-
view of drivers associated with nonmarket institutional pressures that can explain 
why firms undertake nonmarket actions. This brings us closer to the ‘why’ and 
‘how’ of firms respond to these pressures. Due to their conflicting demands and 
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interests, understanding nonmarket institutional pressures, in relation to firm behav-
iour, requires an inclusive approach, which simultaneously considers various types 
of institutions.
5.1  Limitations and Implications
Our study has a number of limitations that should be considered beyond the need to 
understand the underlying drivers of pressures of institutions in the nonmarket envi-
ronment and the strategic responses of firms. First, our study remains exploratory in 
nature, particularly regarding the development of the notion of nonmarket. While we 
effectively measure multiple pressures that the firm is exposed to, our constructs can-
not capture the precise content of the underlying drivers of pressures. Due to the rapid 
development of social media, we were not able to precisely measure the drivers and 
the impact of the pressure of the new media. At the time the survey was conducted, 
firms were not fully aware of the impact of new media on their behaviour. Our forma-
tive indicators offer glimpses into the relative importance of items that form the con-
structs, and these results lay significant groundwork for further investigations, deter-
ministic procedures and analyses of similar data. In addition, our data about impact 
of underlying drivers of pressures are based on information from single respondents, 
leading to rather subjective evaluations. Furthermore, the data reflect the perceptions 
of the MNEs in one country. In terms of further research, we recommend including 
more countries in order to gain deeper insight into the various types of nonmarket 
institutions which influence firms’ actions in different nonmarket contexts.
This study did not include the interaction between market and nonmarket envi-
ronment. The nonmarket strategy does not stand alone, but it should contribute 
to the success of the market strategy of the firms and ultimately the performance 
and sustainable competitive advantage of firms (Baysinger 1984; Hillman and Hitt 
1999; Hillman et al. 2004; van Kranenburg and Voinea 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016; 
Sun et al. 2012). Studies in the international business context also suggest that the 
socially responsible behavior of MNEs can support nonmarket strategies and tac-
tics, in particular the corporate political activities of these firms, to strengthen their 
legitimacy and facilitate the nonmarket tactics and strategies to deal with institu-
tional pressures (e.g., Jamali and Karam 2016; Joutsenvirta and Vaara 2015; Mar-
quis and Qian 2014). Therefore, further nonmarket strategy research should include 
corporate social responsibility and the market environment of firms. Additionally, a 
mixed nonmarket-market model could simultaneously include economic and non-
economic determinants to extend beyond traditional market strategies and advance a 
new concept, incorporating an inclusive range of constituents.
5.2  Further Research
This research is embedded in the economic perspective of new institutionalism and 
the sociological perspective of institutionalism. Building on these two perspectives, 
we recognize a third relevant institutional perspective that is likely to advance the 
nonmarket strategy research and provide insights into this field (Doh et  al. 2012; 
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Nell et  al. 2015). The third perspective is the national business system which is 
also connected to the other two perspectives. The national business system refers to 
country specific systems for corporate governance, systems of collective bargaining 
and relations with stakeholders. Pairing and integrating this perspective with new 
institutional economics and neo  institutionalism would provide a useful organiz-
ing framework for understanding the range of nonmarket strategy perspectives and 
would advance nonmarket strategy research. It focuses on more attention to institu-
tional diversity and the role of actors. This would allow future research to include 
two theoretical effects: The country of origin effect in accordance to which MNEs’ 
strategies and practices are shaped by systems of the country of origin such as cor-
porate governance systems and systems of collective bargaining; and the dominant 
effect, which includes the idea that MNEs from dominant countries of origin are 
able to transfer organizational practices across countries (Dekocker et  al. 2012). 
Furthermore, we are aware that currently many economies (also the Netherlands) 
are regionally integrated; this plays an important role in the institutional setting and 
factors as well as in the institutional interplay and inter-influences. Lawton et  al. 
(2013) pointed out that the political, regulatory and social arrangements are con-
verging in the European Union. For instance, the national business systems of mem-
ber states have become more integrated. The role of the European Commission has 
become more dominant; it increasingly orchestrates the processes between the mem-
ber states, industries and firms. Therefore, a valuable direction for future research 
is given by the vertical institutional integration in the field of nonmarket strategy 
research, to include supranational institutions and their influence on firm nonmar-
ket actions. Thus, nonmarket institutional pressures could also include the interplay 
between national and supranational institutions, offering a multitude of political, 
cultural, social and economic potential issues (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Hillman 
2003; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Zaheer 1995; Zaheer and Zaheer 1997). National-
level institutions fall within supranational arrangements of various types; for every 
issue area (regulatory, political and social), various combinations of supranational 
and intergovernmental elements govern the transactions (Moravcsik 1991). Thus, 
nonmarket institutional pressures, stemming from a supranational echelon, could 
imply the existence of vertical nonmarket institutional pressures. Further investiga-
tion of these nonmarket institutional pressures would bring us a step closer to fram-
ing this challenging concept.
The resource dependency theory posits that MNEs can use particular activities to 
increase legitimacy and performance to influence the dependence of MNEs on insti-
tutions in the nonmarket environment (Getz 2001). In the context of the nonmarket 
strategy literature, the resource dependence theory is often used in conjunction with 
stakeholder or institutional theory. For instance, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) argue 
that while stakeholder theory explains why and how stakeholders influence firm 
conduct and performance, the resource dependence theory provides insight into the 
ability of stakeholders to influence MNE decisions. Arya and Zhang (2009) stress 
the importance of a firm’s stakeholder influence capacity to identify, act on and 
profit from opportunities to improve stakeholder relationships. These theories con-
tribute to the understanding of how firm resources and capabilities are integrated, 
reconfigurated and deployed in the context of different nonmarket institutions. This 
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study complements earlier research which has used various institutional perspec-
tives to explain the drivers of pressures of nonmarket institutions and the nonmarket 
strategies of firms. This study did not address the needed resources and capabilities 
and the managerial decision making and coordinative processes and capabilities by 
which firms assemble and leverage resources and capabilities to develop nonmar-
ket strategies. Building on these theories might be beneficial in moving towards a 
more integrated approach that links the different levels of analysis between organi-
zational and institutional contexts. Consequently, future research could develop an 
assessment of power based on specific nonmarket resources and capabilities and the 
control of these resources and capabilities by the firm and its stakeholders. Another 
benefit of further exploring the relationships between firms and various nonmarket 
institutions in a more integrated approach would be determining which resources 
and capabilities are required to deal with the political, regulatory and social pres-
sures from the institutions and to increase the performance of firms. Due to scar-
city and cost of resources and development of capabilities, it is important that firms 
learn how to allocate the resources and capabilities to market and nonmarket activi-
ties given their financial and other constraints. Building on these ideas is likely to 
advance nonmarket strategy research and provide further insights into this field of 
study.
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